Innovation and Inequality: World Evidence by Benos, Nikos & Tsiachtsiras, Georgios
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Innovation and Inequality: World
Evidence
Nikos Benos and Georgios Tsiachtsiras
University of Ioannina
27 September 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89217/
MPRA Paper No. 89217, posted 28 September 2018 20:30 UTC
1 
 
 
Innovation and Inequality: World Evidence 
Nikos  Benos                  Georgios Tsiachtsiras  
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we use country panel data to explore the effect of innovation on top 
income inequality. We construct a novel dataset of patents by combining patents from 
USPTO and EPO to test the effect of innovation on income inequality. We 
demonstrate that innovation has a strong positive correlation with top income shares. 
Also, we find weak evidence that innovation has a negative effect on overall income 
inequality. We support our findings by using instrumental variables to tackle 
endogeneity. In addition our IV analysis shows that the effect of innovation on top 
income shares remains significant for 3 years. Finally, we show that innovation has a 
less strong effect on top income inequality when we include defensive patents in the 
analysis. 
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1 Introduction 
   Many recent studies show that there is a steady rise in income inequality. According to 
them one factor behind this phenomenon is innovation. Although the literature confirms 
that innovation plays a crucial role in the evolution of income inequality, there is no yet 
a definitive answer on whether this effect is positive or negative. Also, the direction of 
causality between inequality and innovation is not clear yet. 
   Figure 1 illustrates the trends of citations and top one percent income share. After 
1990 we see an increase in both innovation and top income inequality until 2000 where 
innovation reaches at its peak. Afterwards, both variables remain high until 2005 after 
which they start to fall dramatically. We conclude that they have parallel trends for 
many years. In Figure 2 we present a scatter plot of the log differences of citations years 
and top 1% income share. The linear fit reveals a positive correlation between 
innovation and top 1%. This evidence and the work of Aghion et al. (2018) about top 
income inequality in USA inspired us to test the effect of innovation on top income 
inequality at the country level using a world sample.    
   In this paper we argue that innovation is positively associated with top income shares. 
We compose a novel dataset of patents by including patents from EPO and USPTO. 
More details about the construction exist in the Appendix. We use OLS regressions with 
country and year fixed effects to explore this relationship among different countries over 
time. We also apply IV regressions to check the robustness of our basic results and 
confirm that innovation boosts income inequality. Our main contributions in the 
literature are three. First, we contribute to the literature on inequality and growth by 
using innovation as a channel linking the two (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Second, we 
enrich the literature about innovation and income inequality by including in our analysis 
different measures of both innovation and income inequality (Aghion at el., 2018). Last, 
we analyze the influence of the defensive patents on this relationship (Abrams et al., 
2013). 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the relations between 
innovation and income distribution. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 shows the 
empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
   According to many studies innovation has a positive effect on income inequality. First, 
there is the productivity effect which boosts wages of employees who work in 
innovative firms (Lee, 2011). These firms are able to develop new products and as a 
result new jobs are created (Breau et al., 2014). The new jobs require advanced 
technologies suitable only for high skilled employees and this impact shows up in their 
salaries (Lee, 2011 and Breau et al., 2014). Also, innovative regions lure highly skilled 
and highly paid workers (Lee, 2011).  
   Innovation may have different results in countries with dissimilar institutions. For 
example, Scandinavian countries prefer egalitarian societies (Acemoglu et al., 2012). 
Also, in contrast with many European countries, the flexible US markets allow high 
skilled individuals to enter innovative sectors (Lee and Pose, 2012). 
   The effect of innovation is stronger on top income shares than the rest of the income 
distribution (Aghion at el., 2018). According to them, innovation from both incumbents 
and entrants increases top income inequality. The difference between incumbents and 
entrants is that incumbents erect barriers. The barriers discourage new entrants and boost 
top income inequality. Also, the authors propose an additional channel through which 
innovation affects top income inequality. This channel is capital gains. The source of 
capital gains is the award for the innovative companies (mark-up). They indicate that 
through mark-up the companies have managed to increase their profits during the past 
forty years. Entrepreneurs and CEOs earn the bigger share of profits. 
   There are empirical findings, which confirm all above arguments. Lee (2011) uses data 
from the European Community Household Panel for the period 1995-2001 and finds that 
innovation has a positive effect on income inequality. The results are similar for the 
Canadian cities (Breau et al., 2014), while Aghion et al. (2018) focus on top income 
shares for US states. Aghion et al. (2018) conclude that innovation drives inequality and 
not the opposite by applying IV regressions. 
   However many studies indicate that innovation is the key to reduce income inequality. 
There are many arguments, which support this finding. Innovation creates knowledge 
spillovers (Aghion at el., 2018), which can benefit individuals with fewer skills (Lee and 
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Pose, 2012). These individuals can learn from their high skilled partners and augment 
their productivity (Lee, 2011). They then manage to increase their salaries and income 
inequality falls.  
   Apart from the spillovers effect, economic growth may reduce income inequalities 
(Antonelli and Gehringer, 2013). According to them economic growth increases wages 
of all individuals in the economy. They state that the strong price competition among 
companies could decrease the accumulation of rents. Economic growth reduces interest 
rates and this in turn causes a fall in capital gains. They conclude that in a 
Schumpeterian framework with fast rate of technological change the reduction of 
income inequality is possible. However, they recognize that market imperfections have 
negative consequences on the correct allocation of resources in favor of the richest 
people. Aghion et al. (2018) use also in their paper a Schumpeterian framework and 
panel data from USA. Even though they use an economy with fast rate of technological 
change they find significant evidence that innovation has an effect on income inequality 
after many years. It seems that market imperfections and barriers from incumbents help 
to maintain the effect of innovation at least in the short run. Antonelli and Gehringer 
(2013) base their findings on a big sample of European countries, USA, Canada, China, 
Korea and India. 
   Also inequality can affect innovation. A decrease in inequality may trigger an increase 
in the number of customers who can buy new products (Hatipoglu, 2012). The change in 
inequality can affect the inventors’ expected profits and their decisions about R&D 
investments. In addition, this article strengthens our suspicions about the potential 
endogeneity problem between innovation and income inequality. We try to solve this 
problem in a next section.  
3 Data 
   The data on pre-tax income share owned by the top 10%, 1%, 0.5% and 0.1% of 
income earners in our country panel analysis are drawn from the World Wealth and 
Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017). These data are available for some countries 
from 1870 to 2016 but we focus on the period after 1960
1
. We subtract the top 1% 
                                                          
1
 The time series data for the rest of the control variables starts in 1960. 
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income share from the top 10% of income share and then we divide it by nine to create 
the average top income share (Aghion et al, 2018). In addition, we use the Theil index. 
We extract the Theil index from the University of Texas Database which covers the time 
period 1963-2015 for 151 countries (Galbraith et al., 2013). We have chosen the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Frederick Solt, 2016) for the Gini 
index. The Standardized World Income Inequality Database provides us with 100 
equivalent Gini indexes for the pre-tax income and everyone of these has a different 
standard deviation. We include in our analysis the Gini index with the smallest standard 
deviation. Again we use data only after 1960. 
   We apply many measures of innovation. The quantity measures of innovation come 
from WIPO like in the papers of Hatipoglu (2012) and Antonelli and Gehringer (2013). 
The first one is the total number of patents granted (direct and PCT national phase 
entries) and count by filing office. The two other measures, which we use as proxies for 
the number of patents, are the number of residents’ applications and the number of non 
residents’ applications. The number of patents is a crude measure of innovation because 
a patent with a great contribution to the literature and a patent with small contribution 
receive the same weight (Aghion at el., 2018).  
   This is why we apply also quality measures of innovation like citations and the family 
size of patents. The Science, Technology and Innovation Microdatalab of OECD has 
provided us with the databases containing quality measures of innovation. The basic 
Database is the OECD Patent Quality Indicators Database which has the quality 
measures of innovation: citations on a 5-year window, citations on a 7-year window, top 
1% most cited patents and the family size of each patent. In contrast with Aghion et al. 
(2018) our measures of citations do not suffer much from truncation bias because the 
citations are included in the patent document within the first two years since application 
(Squicciarini et al., 2013). We use citations as a measure of innovation because novel 
innovations will have larger mark-ups due to their originality (Abrams et al., 2013). In 
addition, these innovations will generate spillovers for subsequent innovations (Abrams 
et al., 2013). The family size is represented by the number of patent offices at which a 
given invention has been protected. The most valuable patents are being protected from 
many different patent offices (Squicciarini et al., 2013). We provide descriptive details 
about the construction of the databases in the Appendix.  
6 
 
   The Patent Quality Indicators Database includes a variable called grant lag. If the 
value of this variable is high then the patent was granted very fast. In contrast if it is 
missing value then the patent was not granted. This fact allows us to construct two 
separate databases, one with just the patents granted and one with the total number of 
patents. In the main regressions we use only patents that have been granted. However we 
use the second database as a robustness check and to test the hypothesis about defensive 
patents (Aghion at el., 2018). This means that companies make strategic patenting to 
protect their most valuable patents (Abrams et al., 2013). Aghion et al. (2018) use 
citations as a measure of innovation to address this problem. It is logical that the effect 
of innovation on income inequality is smaller when we use the full sample of patents
2
. 
Our purpose is to test this hypothesis.  
   We extract the rest of the control variables from the World Bank database. We have 
used the domestic credit (provided by financial sector as a percentage of GDP) to control 
for the financial sector influence on inequality. The financial sector usually helps the 
inventors to innovate and increase their salaries (Aghion at el., 2018). A big share of the 
employees (almost 27%) who belong in the top 0.1% income share in the United States  
work in the financial sector or use financial services (Szymborska, 2016). The second 
variable is the general government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) in order 
to control for the government size in each country. Empirical studies find that 
government size has a negative effect on capital income inequality and more specifically 
on the top 1% income share (Luo et al., 2017). Next we include in our analysis GDP per 
capita (constant 2010 US$). It has been found that GDP per capita has a positive effect 
on the overall Gini index and on the highest quintile income shares (Barro, 2008). We 
also control for the business cycle by using the unemployment rate (Aghion at el., 2018) 
and also include population growth. We end up with an unbalanced panel of 32 
countries over the time period 1960-2015.  
4 Estimation Methodology 
   Our estimation method is similar with the estimation method of Aghion et al., (2018). 
First we aggregate the number of citations and the family size of each patent at the 
                                                          
2
 We include patent applications and patents that have been granted in the full sample. According to 
Aghion et al. (2018) defensive applications receive fewer citations than the novel applications. 
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country level. We standardize citations and family size by dividing them with the 
number of patents granted in the Patent Quality Indicators database. Next we divide the 
quantity and quality measures of innovation with population. After that we take the log 
of our measures of innovation, inequality and GDP per capita. We estimate the 
following equation: 
   (   ) =  +  +  +     (           ) +     +      
where   stands for country i,   stands for time period t,     is the measure of inequality 
(in log),   is the constant,   ,    correspond to country and year fixed 
effects,             is innovation in year     (also in log) and,    are the other control 
variables. We use year and country fixed effects to account for permanent cross-country 
differences in inequality and overall changes in inequality respectively. The advantage 
by taking both the measure of inequality and the measure of innovation in logs is that    
can be interpreted as the elasticity of inequality with respect to innovation. We estimate 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in all our regressions. 
   We have decided to take the one year lag of innovation as independent variable. Our 
base, Patent Quality Indicators, provides us with the application dates of the patents. We 
include in our analysis patents from both EPO and USPTO. Depalo and Addario (2014) 
use the EPO patents Database and find that inventors’ earnings peak at     instead of 
 . They assume that bureaucracy is responsible for this delay. A second empirical study 
of Bell (2016), who uses patents from USPTO, confirms the conclusion that inventors’ 
income increases before the application date. As a result, we choose the one year lag for 
our measures of innovation.  
   In the second part of our empirical analysis, we try to tackle the endogeneity problem 
between innovation and income inequality. Our instrument is the “charges for the use of 
intellectual property, receipts (BoP, current US$)” from International Monetary Fund. 
Our argument is that countries which possess patents of high quality are going to receive 
bigger amounts of money for the authorized use of proprietary rights such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, industrial processes and designs including trade secrets and 
franchises. This is the first reason why we are interested on the receipts and not 
payments. Intellectual property rights have a positive effect on measures of innovation. 
Strong protection stimulates innovative activity and increases innovation incentives 
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(Kanwar and Evensont, 2003). Kanwar and Evensont (2003) find that intellectual 
property protection has a positive effect on R&D expenditures. Dutta and Sharma (2008) 
test the effect of intellectual property rights on Indian firms and they find that not only 
IPR increases R&D expenditures but also facilitates patenting by India in the U.S. Chu 
et al., (2017) explores the effect of IPR on China. They conclude that IPR has a positive 
effect on innovation. Branstetter et al. (2005) use U.S. multinational firms’ data and find 
limited evidence that IPR boosts domestic innovation. The literature confirms the 
positive relationship between IPR and innovation.  
   Next we examine if this instrument is exogenous to income inequality. Here is the 
second reason why we use receipts. The “charges for the use of intellectual property, 
receipts” come from non-residents. At the country level this means that this amount of 
money enters the domestic market from a foreign country. So, we believe that this 
instrument correlates directly only with our measures of innovation and it is unlikely to 
affect other domestic variables. To avoid any suspicions that our variable could potential 
affect indirectly our measures of inequality we use the lead of the variable as instrument. 
By using the     period for our instrument we believe that the case for it being 
exogenous with regard to income inequality in period   is even stronger. There is a 
second reason for using the     value of our instrument. The grant lag variable, from 
the Patent Quality Indicators database, has an average mean 4.5 for the EPO and an 
average mean 2 approximately for the USPTO. If we combine the two datasets we have 
an average mean of 3 years. This means that a patent needs 3 years from the application 
date to be granted. We apply the     year to the application date in our model and we 
use the     year of our instrument. These are 2 years and we are very close to the 
average mean of the combined dataset. To avoid losing more observations from our 
sample we stop to the one year lead of our instrument. Also it is common that companies 
sell a product embedding an innovation before the patent has been granted (Aghion at 
el., 2018). 
5 Results 
   In this section we present the results from both OLS and IV regressions. All the 
variables are defined in Table 1. First we provide the sample of countries in Table 2 
sorted both by the number of patents and top income share. Seven of the most patenting 
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countries belong to the top 15 countries with the biggest top income share. Then we 
present summary statistics for all variables in Table 3. In Tables 4 and 5 we provide 
descriptive statistics for the measures of innovation and inequality for two distinctive 
years. It is clear that there is a significant increase in the means of our measures of 
inequality from 1990 to 2010. Also the min and the max values increased over these 
years. We reach the same conclusion also from the table with the innovation measures. 
   Next, we provide the results from OLS regressions. Table 6 regresses the top 1% 
income share on our measures of innovation with a 1-year lag. We see that only the 
citations have a significant and positive effect on top 1% income share as we expect 
from theory. We have taken the logs for both measures of innovation and top income 
shares so that we can interpret the coefficient of innovation as elasticity. A 1% increase 
in the number of citations is associated with a 0.0315% increase of the top 1% income 
share. In contrast with citations, family size has no effect on the top 1% income share. 
Two out of three quantity measures of innovation have no effect on the top 1% share but 
residents’ applications appear to have a negative and significant effect. The rest of the 
variables in column 4 have the expected signs. In Table 7 we use cluster standard errors 
at the country level. The citations on a five-year window keep the positive effect but at 
the 10% level of significance. We test the effect of innovation on different top income 
shares in Table 8. The magnitude of the effect is bigger on the top 0.1% income share. 
Next, we test the effect of innovation on different measures of inequality in Table 9. It is 
clear from the table that innovation influences only the top 1% income share. In Table 
10 we apply different lags of innovation on top 1% income share. We find evidence that 
the effect of innovation is significant for six years. This fact implies that the 
Schumpeterian framework does not work very fast and innovation boosts income 
inequality in contrast with the findings of Antonelli and Gehringer (2013).  
   As we said above we have tried to address the endogeneity problem. There are 
empirical studies, which support that inequality drives innovation and not the opposite. 
For instance in Table 6 many measures of innovation are not significant. To provide 
evidence strengthening our claim we have included IV regressions in our analysis. In 
Table 11 we present our results after we add as an instrument the charges of intellectual 
property rights. We see that now all our measures of innovation are significant and have 
a positive effect on the top 1% income share. For instance a 1% increase in the citations 
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on a five year window is associated with a 0.252% rise of the top income share. Like 
Aghion et al. (2018) the magnitude of the coefficient of innovation in column 4 is much 
bigger than the corresponding coefficient in column 4 in Table 6. Aghion et al. (2018) 
state that a good reason could be the interaction between innovation and competition. 
Also, a 1% increase in the applications from residents is responsible for a 0.21% rise of 
the top income share while an equivalent increase in the applications from non residents 
is associated with a 0.0448% increase of the top income share. The results demonstrate 
that domestic innovation spurs the inequality more than the foreign innovation. The 
government size and unemployment rate are also significant and with the expected 
signs. Both variables are in percentages (between 0-1) and we indicate that a 1% 
increase in the government size decreases the top 1% income share by 2.148% while the 
same increase in unemployment rate increases top 1% income share by 0.870% (column 
4). The rest of the variables are not significant in most tables.  
   In contrast with Aghion et al. (2018) we find strong evidence in our sample that 
government size and unemployment rate have the strongest effects and not the financial 
sector. This is not surprising if we consider that in our sample 13 out of 32 are European 
countries. Even though Nickell (1997) states that there are big differences among 
European countries, we cannot skip the fact that unemployment rate is very high in 
Europe (Fanti and Gori, 2011) and many European countries (high GDP countries) have 
passed the optimal level of government size compatible with GDP growth rate 
maximization (Forte and Magazzino, 2011).  
   We present IV regressions on different income shares in Table 12. The effect of 
innovation is significant at least at the 5% level and the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are bigger in very top income shares. Table 13 regresses the different measures of 
inequality on our measure of innovation (citation on a 5-year window). Innovation 
influences positively the top 10%  income share but in column 3 there is no effect on the 
average income share. So, after we subtract the top 1% income share from the top 10% 
the results are not significant. The results are due to the fact that the top 1% income 
share is included in the top 10%. Also, we see in column 4 that citations have a negative 
and significant effect on the Theil index. However, we do not have a significant outcome 
for the Gini index in column 5. Theil index covers only the industrial pay inequality. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient is bigger than on the top 1% income share. 
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There is the probability the effect of innovation on overall income inequality is negative. 
In Table 14 we present different lags of innovation. We see that in contrast with the OLS 
results the innovation effect remains significant only for three years. These findings are 
similar with the corresponding findings of Aghion et al. (2018). 
   Finally in Table 15, we use data from our second dataset with the total number of 
patents (granted and not granted). They are the same quality measures as they were in 
Table 11. The top 1% of most cited patents and the family size are still significant at 5% 
but the citations on a 5- and 7-year window are now significant at 10%. The top 1% of 
most cited patents and the family size cannot take into account the defensive patents. 
But the citations on a 5- or 7-year window “recognize” the defensive patents because the 
defensive patents receive less citations than the original patents (Aghion at el., 2018).  
   In the Appendix first we present the results from IV regressions with the second 
quality measure of innovation, i.e. family size. Next, we provide tables from our second 
dataset with the total number of patents as robustness check. Specifically, Table 16 
presents the results of family size on different measures of inequality. We see that the 
effect of innovation is positive and significant again on top 1% and top 10% income 
share but not on the Average Top. Also like citations, there is a negative correlation 
between family size and the Theil index. In Table 17, we regress family size on different 
top income shares. The magnitude of the coefficient is again bigger on the top 0.5% and 
top 0.1% income share.  
   Next, we use our second sample which includes also defensive patents. In Table 18 we 
use innovation on different measures of inequality and in Table 19 on different income 
shares. We can see that the effect of innovation on top income shares is less significant 
when we apply the full sample of patents.   
6 Conclusions 
   To the best of our knowledge, we make the first attempt to explore the effect of 
innovation on top income shares at the country level. Also, we have tested the effect of 
quality measures of innovation with defensive patents on top income shares.  
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   We find strong evidence that innovation boosts top income inequality. We have also 
checked our findings with different top income shares. Our analysis is based on various 
quantity
3
 and quality
4
 measures of innovation. Quality measures of innovation take into 
consideration the magnitude of the novel inventions in contrast with the quantity 
measures. As a result, quality measures of innovation have a stronger effect on income 
inequality. According to our analysis innovation influences inequality for at least 3 years. 
We have showed also that innovation drives inequality and not the opposite by applying 
IV analysis. When we tested the effect of innovation on different measures of inequality 
we found weak evidence that innovation correlates negatively with overall income 
inequality. We could not explore more the relationship between innovation and top 
income shares due to the limited data on income shares at the country level. Finally, we 
have shown that the effect of innovation, when we include defensive patents, is less 
significant. A future extension of the analysis could include property rights Tebaldi and 
Elmslie (2013) or taxation Akcigit et al. (2016) as additional control variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 We use quantity measures like the number of patents granted, and the applications from residents and 
non residents. 
4
 We use quality measures like the number of citations and the family size which each patent belong.  
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Notes: Figure 1 plots the number of citations in millions distributed by their year of application 
against the top 1% income share for the countries as a whole. Observations span the years 1976-
2015. Top 1% income shares come from WID and citations data come from the USPTO and EPO. 
Notes: Figure 2 plots percentage change in the number of citations per capita against percent 
change in top 1% income share between 1995 and 2010 for 20 countries. Observations are 
computed at the country level. 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
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Table 1: Variable description and notation 
Variable names Description 
 Measures of Inequality 
Top i% Share of income own by the top i% (i being equal to 10, 1, 0.5 and 0.1) of 
the income distribution. Time: 1960-2016. Source: WID. 
Avgtop  Average income share for the percentiles 10 to 2 in the income distribution. 
Time: 1960-2016. Source: WID. 
Gini  Gini index of inequality with the smallest standard deviation. Time: 1960-
2016.  Source: SWIID.  
Theil Theil index of inequality. Time: 1963-2015. Source: University of Texas. 
  
 Measures of innovation 
Patent Total patent grants (direct and PCT national phase entries) by filing office. 
Time: 1980-2015. Source: WIPO.  
Applic (N) Nonresident filings through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or 
with a national patent office. Time: 1960-2015. Source: WIPO.  
Applic (R) Resident filings through the Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a 
national patent office. Time: 1960-2015. Source: WIPO.  
Cit5 Total number of citations received no longer than 5 years after applications 
per capita. Time: 1976-2016. Source: OECD. 
Cit7 Total number of citations received no longer than 7 years after applications 
per capita. Time: 1976-2016. Source: OECD. 
Famsize The number of patent offices at which a given invention has been protected 
per capita. Time: 1976-2016. Source: OECD. 
Top1 Number of patents in the top 1% most cited per capita. Time: 1976-2016. 
Source: OECD. 
  
 Control Variables 
Popgr Growth of total population. Time: 1960-2015. Source: World Bank. 
Gvtsize General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP). Time: 
1960-2016. Source: World Bank.  
Unemployment Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate). Time: 
1960-2016. Source: World Bank. 
Gdppc Real GDP per capita in US $ (in log). Time: 1960-2016. Source: World 
Bank.  
Finance Domestic credit provided by financial sector (% of GDP). Time: 1960-2016. 
Source: World Bank.  
  
 Instrument 
Charges Charges for the use of intellectual property, receipts (BoP, current US$). 
Time: 1960-2016. Source: International Monetary Fund. 
  
 
18 
 
  
  
 
  Table 2: Countries sorted by top income share and number of patents granted 
Top 1% Income Share  
 
Patents 
Country 
 
 Country 
 Brazil 0.2769  United States 139206.6 
Lebanon 0.2303  Japan 125539.4 
Turkey 0.2062  China 63581.03 
Zimbabwe 0.1965  Korea 43036.69 
Colombia 0.1957  Russian Federation 24429.17 
Russian Federation 0.1480  Canada 16460.89 
United States 0.1451  Germany 16210.78 
Argentina 0.1439  France 14566.72 
South Africa 0.1359  Australia 11977.39 
India 0.1327  United Kingdom 11050.67 
Germany 0.1175  Italy 8546.971 
Singapore 0.1164  South Africa 4825.5 
Canada 0.1067  Singapore 4625.12 
China 0.1052  Spain 3785.139 
Indonesia 0.1051  Brazil 3517.875 
Malaysia 0.1000  India 3507.6 
France 0.0992  New Zealand 3484.389 
United Kingdom 0.0980  Sweden 3074.333 
Switzerland 0.0967  Switzerland 2957.857 
Japan 0.0955  Netherlands 2587.639 
Spain 0.0907  Finland 1886.778 
Korea 0.0890  Malaysia 1865.774 
Ireland 0.0817  Argentina 1708.5 
Italy 0.0797  Indonesia 1105 
Portugal 0.0762  Denmark 1034.444 
New Zealand 0.0745  Ireland 882.4 
Finland 0.0725  Turkey 809.0882 
Mauritius 0.0712  Portugal 789.5278 
Sweden 0.0665  Colombia 545 
Netherlands 0.0659  Lebanon 308.4 
Australia 0.0652  Zimbabwe 178.7647 
Denmark 0.0622  Mauritius 5.6 
Notes: The right column illustrates the countries sorted by the mean of top 1 percent income share over the period 
1960-2015 while the left column represents the countries sorted by the mean number of patents granted over the period 
1980-2015. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of the main variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     Measures of Inequality 
    Top 10% Income Share 13109.01 27272.39 0.1396 0.6508 
Avgtop 22734.3 69637.22 0.0100 0.0510 
Top 1% Income Share 17705.88 42811.72 0.0345 0.2943 
Top 0.5% Income Share 59959.04 241493.1 0.0198 0.2411 
Top 0.1% Income Share 79754.72 323702.8 0.0054 0.1661 
Theil 59816.01 159970.8 0.0013 0.1483 
Gini 78.63667 291.099 0.2971 0.6954 
     Measures of Innovation 
    Patents 0.0362 0.0254 1 359316 
Applic(N) 0.0760 0.0397 3 301075 
Applic(R) 0.1046 0.0478 1 968252 
Cit5 0.3380 0.0750 0 2581189 
Cit7 0.0265 0.0044 0 3449904 
Famsize 0.0313 0.0244 1 1183832 
Top 1% of Citations 0.4603 0.0632 0 2381 
     Rest of the control variables 
    Popgrowth 1.1418 0.9208 -1.8537 7.0610 
Gdppc(log) 9.4405 1.2725 4.8825 11.2359 
Unemployment 6.9325 4.3912 0.08 27.14 
Finance 89.0233 60.3729 7.1173 363.306 
Gonverment 15.9056 4.7387 2.9755 27.935 
     Instrument 
    Charges  3.63e+09 1.29e+10 0 1.30e+11 
     Notes: Summary statistics for the main variables calculated over the period 1960-2016. GDP per capita is calculated
in $ per capita. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of measures of innovation  
1990 Mean Min Max P5 P25 P50 P90 
Measure of Innovation 
       Patents 10432.81 13 90366 134 852 3402.5 19073 
Applic(N) 8963.88 3 80520 764 1843 4001 24375 
Applic(R) 21758.76 1 332952 92 955 2218 30724 
Cit5 26777.35 3 421495 5 42 556 25119 
Cit7 40939.26 3 668192 7 72 805 37552 
Famsize 51963.65 6 583991 21 187 1547 110387 
Top 1% of Citations 73.1613 0 1360 0 0 1 52 
2010 Mean Min Max P5 P25 P50 P90 
Measure of Innovation 
       Patents 28304.29 8 222693 140 1144.5 4394.5 135110 
Applic(N) 20776.53 46 248249 59 353 5137 46406.5 
Applic(R) 37691.6 133 293066 499 1231 2853.5 186891 
Cit5 102712.1 44 1657790 63 610 9587 110670 
Cit7 108812.5 44 1763210 74 638 9957 118880 
Famsize 85133.87 35 875996 84 1580 17523 163576 
Top 1% of Citations 104.0968 0 1915 0 0 4 79 
Notes: Summary statistics includes mean, percentile thresholds, minimum and maximum for our seven measures of 
innovation. 
  
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of measures of inequality  
1990 Mean Min Max P5 P25 P50 P90 
Measures of Inequality 
       Top 1% Income Share 0.0843 0.0493 0.1454 0.0517 0.0664 0.0810 0.1122 
Top 10% Income Share 0.3052 0.1555 0.3892 0.1957 0.2687 0.3108 0.3781 
Avgtop 0.0248 0.0118 0.0301 0.0118 0.0226 0.0255 0.0299 
Top 0.5% Income Share 0.0585 0.0331 0.1095 0.0337 0.04 0.0575 0.0877 
Top 0.1% Income Share 0.0269 0.0109 0.0555 0.0109 0.016 0.0269 0.0545 
Theil 0.0296 0.0029 0.0719 0.0062 0.0127 0.0258 0.0562 
Gini 0.4502 0.3092 0.6330 0.3814 0.4163 0.4428 0.5061 
2010 Mean Min Max P5 P25 P50 P90 
Measures of Inequality 
       Top 1% Income Share 0.1382 0.0641 0.2776 0.0645 0.0898 0.1255 0.2122 
Top 10% Income Share 0.3953 0.2463 0.6067 0.2688 0.3099 0.3966 0.5217 
Avgtop 0.0290 0.0169 0.0468 0.0227 0.0245 0.0290 0.0347 
Top 0.5% Income Share 0.1029 0.0403 0.2270 0.0432 0.0643 0.0923 0.1628 
Top 0.1% Income Share 0.0577 0.0186 0.1347 0.0220 0.0322 0.0484 0.1019 
Theil 0.0344 0.0069 0.0919 0.0132 0.0153 0.0265 0.0829 
Gini 0.4862 0.3446 0.6954 0.3993 0.4531 0.4822 0.5441 
Notes: Summary statistics includes mean, percentile thresholds, minimum and maximum for our seven measures of 
inequality. 
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Table 6: Top 1% income share and innovation 
Dependent Variable   Top 1% income share   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Measure of Innovation Patents Applic (N) Applic (R) Cit5 Cit7 Famsize Top1 
Innovation 0.0117 0.00777 -0.100*** 0.0315** 0.0263* 0.0240 0.0364*** 
 (1.57) (1.21) (-8.96) (2.55) (1.93) (1.27) (5.00) 
        
Popgr 0.0285** 0.00853 -0.00648 0.0168 0.0176 0.0174 0.0176 
 (2.05) (0.70) (-0.62) (1.45) (1.51) (1.48) (1.64) 
        
Gvtsize -2.734*** -3.247*** -3.562*** -2.802*** -2.817*** -2.846*** -2.665*** 
 (-5.77) (-7.17) (-8.76) (-6.47) (-6.51) (-6.66) (-6.27) 
        
Unemployment 0.918*** 0.577** 0.940*** 0.965*** 0.976*** 0.971*** 1.086*** 
 (3.45) (2.09) (3.78) (3.92) (3.94) (3.92) (4.60) 
        
Gdppc 0.0954*** 0.0331 0.365*** 0.0901*** 0.0918*** 0.0925*** 0.184*** 
 (2.80) (1.24) (9.25) (4.03) (4.12) (4.22) (7.19) 
        
Finance 0.0204 0.0293 0.0156 0.0410* 0.0413* 0.0425* 0.0260 
 (0.80) (1.14) (0.67) (1.69) (1.69) (1.72) (1.12) 
        
R
2
 0.938 0.919 0.927 0.932 0.932 0.931 0.935 
Observations 652 777 774 737 737 737 737 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span for innovation: 1982-2015 for column 1, 1962-2015 for columns 2 and 3 and 1978-
2015 for columns 4-7. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively 
indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
    Table 7: Top 1% income share and innovation 
Dependent Variable   Top 1% income share   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Measure of Innovation Patents Applic (N) Applic (R) Cit5 Cit7 Famsize Top1 
Innovation 0.0117 0.00777 -0.100*** 0.0315* 0.0263 0.0240 0.0364*** 
 (0.73) (0.35) (-4.56) (1.96) (1.54) (1.10) (3.19) 
        
Popgr 0.0285 0.00853 -0.00648 0.0168 0.0176 0.0174 0.0176 
 (1.13) (0.30) (-0.44) (0.60) (0.63) (0.60) (0.65) 
        
Gvtsize -2.734*** -3.247*** -3.562*** -2.802*** -2.817*** -2.846*** -2.665*** 
 (-3.10) (-3.18) (-4.19) (-3.23) (-3.22) (-3.20) (-3.00) 
        
Unemployment 0.918 0.577 0.940* 0.965 0.976 0.971 1.086* 
 (1.40) (0.96) (1.88) (1.66) (1.67) (1.63) (2.00) 
        
Gdppc 0.0954 0.0331 0.365*** 0.0901 0.0918 0.0925 0.184*** 
 (1.51) (0.45) (4.59) (1.41) (1.44) (1.50) (4.13) 
        
Finance 0.0204 0.0293 0.0156 0.0410 0.0413 0.0425 0.0260 
 (0.36) (0.54) (0.35) (0.71) (0.72) (0.72) (0.51) 
        
R
2
 0.938 0.919 0.927 0.932 0.932 0.931 0.935 
Observations 652 777 774 737 737 737 737 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variable is the log of the top 1% income share. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span for innovation: 1982-2015 for column 1, 1962-2015 for columns 2 and 3 and 
1978-2015 for columns 4-7. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the country level are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance.  
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Table 8: Innovation and various measures of inequality based on different income shares 
Dependent Variable Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Top0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Innovation 0.0113 0.0248* 0.0308* 0.0461** 
 (1.39) (1.77) (1.89) (2.07) 
     
Popgr -0.0206*** -0.0111 -0.00707 0.00701 
 (-3.11) (-1.07) (-0.57) (0.43) 
     
Gvtsize -0.184 -2.370*** -2.967*** -4.315*** 
 (-0.79) (-5.35) (-5.54) (-5.53) 
     
Unemployment 0.642*** 0.695** 0.621* 0.690 
 (4.27) (2.48) (1.85) (1.41) 
     
Gdppc 0.110*** 0.0888*** 0.0766*** 0.0640** 
 (10.83) (3.99) (3.03) (2.07) 
     
Finance -0.0191 -0.0299 -0.0347 -0.0345 
 (-1.43) (-1.22) (-1.19) (-0.84) 
     
R
2
 0.950 0.947 0.942 0.930 
Observations 588 588 588 588 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span for innovation: 1978-2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
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Table 9: Innovation and various measures of inequality 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top10% Avgtop Theil Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Innovation 0.0315** 0.0103 0.00687 -0.00145 0.00136 
 (2.55) (1.07) (0.76) (-0.06) (0.32) 
      
Popgr 0.0168 -0.00751 -0.0105 -0.0561* 0.00535 
 (1.45) (-1.13) (-1.51) (-1.92) (1.55) 
      
Gvtsize -2.802*** -0.364 0.833*** 0.0127 -0.196* 
 (-6.47) (-1.43) (3.25) (0.02) (-1.67) 
      
Unemployment 0.965*** 0.766*** 0.785*** 1.045** 0.517*** 
 (3.92) (5.43) (5.77) (2.11) (6.78) 
      
Gdppc 0.0901*** 0.112*** 0.114*** -0.0589 0.0522*** 
 (4.03) (10.95) (10.34) (-0.39) (2.67) 
      
Finance 0.0410* 0.0251* 0.0292* 0.208*** 0.0358*** 
 (1.69) (1.72) (1.94) (4.66) (5.84) 
      
R
2
 0.932 0.932 0.889 0.873 0.867 
Observations 737 680 676 868 962 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Panel data OLS 
regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span for innovation: 1978-2015 for columns 1- 4 and 1978-2016 for 
column 5. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1levels of significance. 
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Table 10: Top 1% income share and innovation at different lags 
Dependent Variable   Top 1% Income Share   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Lag of Innovation 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 
Innovation 0.0323** 0.0466*** 0.0384*** 0.0344*** 0.0324** 0.0351*** 
 (2.16) (3.03) (3.07) (2.81) (1.99) (2.78) 
       
Popgr 0.0115 0.0123 0.0103 0.00989 0.0109 0.0132 
 (0.92) (0.94) (0.80) (0.79) (0.88) (1.05) 
       
Gvtsize -2.345*** -2.201*** -2.244*** -2.241*** -2.275*** -2.353*** 
 (-4.56) (-4.36) (-4.39) (-4.38) (-4.36) (-4.71) 
       
Unemployment 0.896*** 0.856*** 0.852*** 0.850*** 0.832*** 0.843*** 
 (3.39) (3.21) (3.23) (3.23) (3.26) (3.23) 
       
Gdppc 0.159*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.153*** 0.147*** 
 (5.88) (5.29) (5.57) (5.36) (5.69) (5.39) 
       
Finance 0.0159 0.0101 0.0137 0.0159 0.0144 0.0124 
 (0.65) (0.41) (0.55) (0.64) (0.58) (0.50) 
       
R
2
 0.938 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 
Observations 652 652 652 652 652 652 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs. The lag between the dependent variable and the innovation measures ranges from 1 year to 6 years. The 
dependent variable is taken in log. Panel data OLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Time span for innovation: 1983-2015. 
Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 11: Regression of innovation on top 1% income share – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable   Top 1% Income Share   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Measure of Innovation Patents (G) Applic (N) Applic (R) Cit5 Cit7 Famsize Top1 
Innovation 0.0331* 0.0448*** 0.210*** 0.252** 0.256** 0.181** 0.129** 
 (1.86) (4.32) (2.81) (1.98) (1.99) (2.39) (2.47) 
        
Popgr 0.00821 0.00319 0.00586 -0.00578 -0.000514 -0.00772 -0.00899 
 (0.66) (0.24) (0.21) (-0.46) (-0.04) (-0.66) (-0.81) 
        
Gvtsize -2.108*** -1.825*** -1.932*** -2.148*** -2.216*** -2.248*** -1.688*** 
 (-4.14) (-3.15) (-2.59) (-3.55) (-3.59) (-4.59) (-2.81) 
        
Unemployment 0.928*** 0.745** 0.654 0.870** 0.947*** 1.066*** 1.145*** 
 (2.84) (2.36) (1.52) (2.46) (2.74) (3.45) (4.18) 
        
Gdppc 0.000339 -0.0782** -0.627*** -0.0122 -0.0131 0.0226 0.381*** 
 (0.01) (-2.13) (-2.62) (-0.21) (-0.22) (0.62) (3.02) 
        
Finance -0.00820 -0.00518 0.0176 -0.0166 -0.0197 0.00794 -0.0551 
 (-0.27) (-0.16) (0.36) (-0.40) (-0.47) (0.24) (-1.14) 
        
F first stage 117.03 243.82 40.49 10.90 11.04 48.48 13.38 
R
2
 0.653 0.635 0.332 0.513 0.501 0.656 0.609 
Observations 554 617 614 616 616 616 616 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Innovation is 
instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and the endogenous variable is set to 1 
year. Time span for innovation: 1981-2014 for column 1, 1969-2014 for columns 2, 3 and 1977-2014 for columns 4-7. Number of groups: 
30 for column 1 and 31 for columns 2-7. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 12: Regression of innovation on different income shares – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Top0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Innovation 0.209*** 0.252** 0.319** 0.274** 
 (2.71) (1.98) (2.33) (2.02) 
     
Popgr -0.00595 -0.00578 -0.00844 -0.0113 
 (-0.60) (-0.46) (-0.62) (-0.73) 
     
Gvtsize 0.150 -2.148*** -2.161*** -4.092*** 
 (0.35) (-3.55) (-2.75) (-4.16) 
     
Unemployment 0.721*** 0.870** 0.964** 1.253** 
 (3.06) (2.46) (2.28) (2.31) 
     
Gdppc 0.0404 -0.0122 -0.0267 -0.0222 
 (1.14) (-0.21) (-0.40) (-0.37) 
     
Finance -0.00419 -0.0166 -0.0878* -0.103* 
 (-0.17) (-0.40) (-1.83) (-1.73) 
     
F first stage 15.95 10.90 12.43 14.41 
R
2
 0.163 0.513 0.423 0.613 
Observations 565 616 579 539 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. 
Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and the 
endogenous variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for 
column 1-4. Number of groups: 27 for columns 1 and 4, 31 for column 2 and 29 for column 3. Autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels of significance. 
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Table 13: Regression of innovation on different measures of inequality – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top10% Avgtop Theil Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Innovation 0.252** 0.209*** 0.0592 -0.383* 0.0273 
 (1.98) (2.71) (1.27) (-1.66) (0.73) 
      
Popgr -0.00578 -0.00595 -0.00384 0.0392 0.00689* 
 (-0.46) (-0.60) (-0.47) (1.13) (1.85) 
      
Gvtsize -2.148*** 0.150 0.756** -1.324 -0.290** 
 (-3.55) (0.35) (2.55) (-1.40) (-2.31) 
      
Unemployment 0.870** 0.721*** 0.808*** 1.832** 0.498*** 
 (2.46) (3.06) (4.64) (2.22) (5.59) 
      
Gdppc -0.0122 0.0404 0.100*** 0.479** 0.0532** 
 (-0.21) (1.14) (5.34) (2.44) (2.23) 
      
Finance -0.0166 -0.00419 0.0362* 0.367*** 0.0369*** 
 (-0.40) (-0.17) (1.77) (4.56) (4.61) 
      
F first stage 10.90 15.95 17.46 10.90 6.73 
R
2
 0.513 0.163 0.361 0.023 0.426 
Observations 616 565 561 734 828 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed 
effects. Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and 
the endogenous variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for 
column 1-5. Number of groups: 31 for columns 1, 4, 5 and 27 for columns 2 and 3. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
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Table 14: Regression of innovation on top 1% income share at different lags – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable  Top 1% Income Share  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Lag of Innovation 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 
Innovation 0.252** 0.204* 0.230* 0.270 0.386 
 (1.98) (1.94) (1.76) (1.62) (0.99) 
      
Popgr -0.00578 -0.00590 -0.0170 -0.0297 -0.0201 
 (-0.46) (-0.42) (-1.16) (-1.49) (-1.28) 
      
Gvtsize -2.148*** -1.439** -0.718 -0.399 -0.128 
 (-3.55) (-2.22) (-0.79) (-0.41) (-0.07) 
      
Unemployment 0.870** 0.611 0.481 0.519 0.231 
 (2.46) (1.40) (1.00) (1.06) (0.24) 
      
Gdppc -0.0122 0.00945 0.00223 -0.0235 -0.0423 
 (-0.21) (0.19) (0.04) (-0.27) (-0.25) 
      
Finance -0.0166 -0.0204 -0.0391 -0.0478 -0.0932 
 (-0.40) (-0.50) (-0.84) (-1.00) (-0.96) 
      
F first stage 10.90 11.05 8.77 5.32 1.34 
R
2
 0.513 0.579 0.550 0.450 0.226 
Observations 616 603 596 585 571 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs. The lag between the dependent variable and the innovation measure ranges from 1 year to 5 years. Panel 
data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. 
The lead between the instrument and the endogenous variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variable is taken in log. Time span for 
innovation: 1977-2014 for column 1, 1978-2014 for column 2, 1979-2014 for column 3, 1980-2014 for column 4 and 1981-2014 for 
column 5. Number of groups: 31 for columns 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 15: Regression of innovation on top 1% income share – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top 1% Income Share  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit7 Famsize Top1 
Innovation 0.287* 0.291* 0.176** 0.133** 
 (1.82) (1.83) (2.48) (2.43) 
     
Popgr -0.00266 0.00392 -0.00448 -0.00718 
 (-0.20) (0.30) (-0.39) (-0.62) 
     
Gvtsize -2.059*** -2.160*** -2.323*** -1.574** 
 (-3.16) (-3.27) (-4.79) (-2.49) 
     
Unemployment 0.788** 0.894** 1.081*** 1.093*** 
 (2.07) (2.49) (3.58) (3.87) 
     
Gdppc 0.00840 0.00875 0.0306 0.399*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.91) (2.93) 
     
Finance -0.0226 -0.0258 0.00486 -0.0761 
 (-0.50) (-0.56) (0.15) (-1.35) 
     
F first stage 7.61 7.64 70.10 13.66 
R
2
 0.476 0.461 0.667 0.607 
Observations 614 614 614 614 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year 
fixed effects. Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the 
instrument and the endogenous variable is set to 1 year. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for columns 1-4. 
Number of groups: 31 for columns 1-4. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Appendix 
Methodology of construction of the database 
   Every patent to our database has two unique id codes. The first is an id code for the 
PATSTAT database. The second is the application number of each patent. These codes 
are important because with their help we manage to assign the patents to their inventors. 
We allocate the patents based on the inventors’ location (country). According to Aghion 
et al. (2018) the location of the inventor and assignee coincide (they have a correlation 
higher than 95%). The locations of the inventors for the European Patent Office exist in 
the OECD REGPAT Database. The OECD REGPAT Database has also the id code of 
the PATSTAT database. We match the patents with the inventors and their countries. 
We manage to assign 1,617,825 out of 3,190,373 patents to their inventors. To extend 
our sample of patents we use also the locations of the inventors of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office. First, we use the id of the PATSTAT Database to match 
the patents with the inventors who belong in the USPTO and exist in the OECD 
Database on Triadic Patent Families. We have managed to match 2,081,862 out of 
7,763,046 patents from the Patent Quality Indicators Database with their inventors. To 
avoid losing the rest of the observations we use the Database from the Patent Data 
Project of National Bureau of Economic Research. This Database has the inventors of 
USPTO from 1901 to 2006. We use this time the USPTO application number of each 
patent to do the matching. This method allows us to save 2,203,978 more patents. When 
we combine these datasets our sample includes 5,903,665 different patents from EPO 
and USPTO. After we allocate the different patents based on their inventors to the 
countries, we have a sample of 15,454,398 patents for 32 countries over the period 
1976-2015. 
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Table 16: Regression of innovation on different measures of inequality – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top10% Avgtop Theil Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Measure of Innovation Famsize Famsize Famsize Famsize Famsize 
Innovation 0.181** 0.162*** 0.0482 -0.359* 0.0249 
 (2.39) (3.32) (1.31) (-1.83) (0.74) 
      
Popgr -0.00772 -0.0147 -0.00582 0.0228 0.00762** 
 (-0.66) (-1.45) (-0.71) (0.66) (2.12) 
      
Gvtsize -2.248*** -0.558* 0.599** 0.277 -0.373*** 
 (-4.59) (-1.72) (2.10) (0.30) (-2.94) 
      
Unemployment 1.066*** 0.708*** 0.779*** 1.117** 0.511*** 
 (3.45) (3.44) (4.40) (2.17) (6.26) 
      
Gdppc 0.0226 0.0580** 0.105*** 0.363** 0.0579*** 
 (0.62) (2.23) (6.26) (2.20) (2.90) 
      
Finance 0.00794 0.0171 0.0430** 0.280*** 0.0405*** 
 (0.24) (0.81) (2.21) (4.90) (5.72) 
      
F first stage 48.48 56.81 55.98 27.93 20.46 
Observations 616 565 561 734 828 
R
2
 0.656 0.511 0.390 0.126 0.474 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. 
Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and the endogenous 
variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for column 1-5. Number of 
groups: 31 for columns 1, 4, 5 and 27 for columns 2 and 3. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 17: Regression of innovation on different income shares – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Top0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Innovation  Famsize Famsize Famsize Famsize 
Innovation 0.162*** 0.181** 0.228*** 0.193** 
 (3.32) (2.39) (2.82) (2.21) 
     
Popgr -0.0147 -0.00772 -0.0148 -0.0192 
 (-1.45) (-0.66) (-1.13) (-1.21) 
     
Gvtsize -0.558* -2.248*** -2.684*** -4.486*** 
 (-1.72) (-4.59) (-5.09) (-5.82) 
     
Unemployment 0.708*** 1.066*** 1.039*** 1.214** 
 (3.44) (3.45) (2.98) (2.41) 
     
Gdppc 0.0580** 0.0226 0.0187 0.0153 
 (2.23) (0.62) (0.47) (0.39) 
     
Finance 0.0171 0.00794 -0.0391 -0.0699 
 (0.81) (0.24) (-1.20) (-1.46) 
     
F first stage 56.81 48.48 55.05 68.86 
R
2
 0.511 0.656 0.658 0.683 
Observations 565 616 579 539 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. 
Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and the endogenous 
variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for column 1- 4. Number 
of groups: 27 for columns 1 and 4, 31 for column 2 and 29 for column 3. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
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Table 18: Regression of innovation on different measures of inequality – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top1% Top10% Avgtop Theil Gini 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
Innovation 0.287* 0.215*** 0.0609 -0.486* 0.0405 
 (1.82) (2.64) (1.27) (-1.65) (0.92) 
      
Popgr -0.00266 -0.00580 -0.00375 0.0347 0.00746** 
 (-0.20) (-0.57) (-0.45) (0.95) (1.98) 
      
Gvtsize -2.059*** 0.244 0.781** -1.505 -0.274** 
 (-3.16) (0.55) (2.55) (-1.46) (-2.02) 
      
Unemployment 0.788** 0.715*** 0.807*** 1.915** 0.503*** 
 (2.07) (3.07) (4.62) (2.18) (5.76) 
      
Gdppc 0.00840 0.0609** 0.106*** 0.473** 0.0526** 
 (0.15) (2.07) (6.92) (2.33) (2.26) 
      
Finance -0.0226 -0.00474 0.0360* 0.362*** 0.0373*** 
 (-0.50) (-0.18) (1.72) (4.48) (4.81) 
      
F first stage 7.61 14.54 15.87 7.71 5.21 
R
2
 0.476 0.190 0.357 -0.030 0.392 
Observations 614 563 559 717 809 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed 
effects. Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and 
the endogenous variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for 
column 1-5. Number of groups: 31 for columns 1, 4, 5 and 27 for columns 2 and 3. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of 
significance. 
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Table 19: Regression of innovation on different income shares – IV estimation 
Dependent Variable Top10% Top1% Top0.5% Top0.1% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Measure of Innovation Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 Cit5 
lcits5_pcl1 0.215*** 0.287* 0.362** 0.295* 
 (2.64) (1.82) (2.15) (1.94) 
     
Popgr -0.00580 -0.00266 -0.00479 -0.00900 
 (-0.57) (-0.20) (-0.33) (-0.56) 
     
Gvtsize 0.244 -2.059*** -2.024** -4.126*** 
 (0.55) (-3.16) (-2.36) (-4.12) 
     
Unemployment 0.715*** 0.788** 0.897** 1.251** 
 (3.07) (2.07) (2.08) (2.34) 
     
Gdppc 0.0609** 0.00840 0.00118 0.00733 
 (2.07) (0.15) (0.02) (0.15) 
     
Finance -0.00474 -0.0226 -0.0948* -0.112* 
 (-0.18) (-0.50) (-1.79) (-1.76) 
     
F first stage   14.54   7.61 8.98 11.40 
N 563 614 577 537 
R
2
 0.190 0.476 0.367 0.609 
Notes: Innovation is taken in logs and lagged by one year. Panel data IV 2SLS regressions with country and year fixed effects. 
Innovation is instrumented by the charges for the use of intellectual property. The lead between the instrument and the endogenous 
variable is set to 1 year. The dependent variables are taken in logs. Time span for innovation: 1977-2014 for column 1-4. Number 
of groups: 27 for columns 1 and 4, 31 for column 2 and 29 for column 3. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * respectively indicate 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels of significance. 
     
 
 
 
 
